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NOTES
THE UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT: STRENGTHENING
NEW YORKS PROTECTION FOR UNWED
MOTHERS"
INTRODUCTION
Adoption establishes a legal relationship of child and par-
ent between persons who are not related biologically.' Simul-
taneously, adoption severs any legal relationship between the
adopted child and his or her biological parents, thereby termi-
nating all the biological parents' rights and responsibilities
associated with the child.2 Because the federal government
traditionally has refrained from interfering in domestic rela-
tions,' no federal adoption statute exists.' The creation of
' This article is limited to the unique situation of unwed birth mothers who,
unlike many married couples, are considered more suspectable to coercion, fraud,
and duress because they are often young and extremely vulnerable to societal, fa-
milial, and financial pressures to place their children up for adoption. Jane A.
Robert, Parental Consent The Need for an Informed Decision in the Private Adop-
tion Scheme, 47 LA. L. REV. 889, 895 (1987).
1 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 110 (IMcKinney 1988). See also Dennis T. v. Joseph
C., 82 A.D.2d 125, 128, 441 N.Y.S.2d 476, 479 (2d Dept 1981) ("Adoption is the
legal proceeding whereby a person takes another person into the relation of [a]
child .... "); ROBERT A. FARmER, How TO ADOPT A CHILD 7 (2d ed. 1968).
2 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 1988) ("After the making of an
order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of all
parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no rights over
such adoptive child").
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (explaining that state laws tra-
ditionally govern a multitude of parent-child relationships including child custody
and adoption).
' More than a decade ago, a congressional effort to draft a uniform adoption
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adoption law and regulation of the adoption process is entirely
within the discretion of the individual states.5
Although New York has designed its adoption scheme to
promote and protect the best interests of the child,' in the last
two decades unwed mothers have bombarded New York courts
with adoption challenges seeking to undo finalized placements
on the theory that the adoptions violated their parental
rights.7 Many unwed birth mothers challenge adoptions on
act failed and it is highly unlikely that Congress will succeed in enacting a federal
adoption statute in the near future. See Mark Hansen, Fears of the Heart, 80
A.B . J. 58, 62 (Nov. 1994).
6 Although state legislatures draft and implement adoption statutes, federal
constitutional limits circumscribe the states' discretion. In fact, adoption statute
provisions have been declared unconstitutional on more than one occasion. See,
e.g., In re Raquel Marie, 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 928, cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 984 (1990) (holding that New York Domestic Relations Law §
lll-e, which required unwed fathers to openly live with the unwed mothers for six
months prior to an adoption in order to veto the adoption, violated Equal Protec.
tion); see also, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1980) (holding that a sex-based
distinction in New York Domestic Relation Law § 111, which authorized unwed
mothers, but not unwed fathers, to withhold consent to their child's adoption,
violated Equal Protection); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding
that an Illinois statute, which automatically terminated unwed fathers' parental
rights without a hearing upon the death of children's mother, violated Due Process
and Equal Protection).
' See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1988) ("If satisfied that the best
interests of the adoptive child will be promoted thereby, the judge . . . shall make
an order approving the adoption.").
In re Amanda B., 206 A.D.2d 636, 614 N.Y.S.2d 607 (3d Dep't 1994); In re
Female R. 202 A.D.2d 672, 609 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dep't 1994); In re Baby Girl J.,
192 A.D.2d 533, 595 N.Y.S.2d 816 (2d Dep't 1993); In re Ricardo N., 195 A.D.2d
559, 600 N.Y.S.2d 730 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 661, 625 N.E.2d 591,
605 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1993); In re Adoption of Baby Boy "B"., 163 A.D.2d 673, 558
N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 710, 564 N.E.2d 672, 536
N.Y.S.2d 62 (1990); In re Adoption of Samuel, 167 A.D. 2d 909, 562 N.Y.S.2d 278
(4th Dep't 1990), appeal granted, 77 N.Y.2d 804, 571 N.E.2d 82, 568 N.Y.S.2d 912
(1991); In re Ricky AA., 146 A.D.2d 433, 541 N.Y.S.2d 264 (3d Dep't 1989), affd,
75 N.Y.2d 885, 553 N.E.2d 1021, 554 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1990); Margenesy v. Manitta,
156 A.D.2d 1026, 549 N.Y.S.2d 307 (4th Dep't 1989); In re Baby Boy L., 144
A.D.2d 674, 534 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1988), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 606, 541
N.E.2d 427, 543 N.Y.S.2d 398, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 918 (1989); See In re Sarah
K., 110 A.D.2d 18, 492 N.Y.S.2d 957 (2d Dep't) rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 223, 487 N.E.2d
241, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); Dennis T. v.
Joseph C., 82 A.D.2d 125, 441 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2d Dep't 1981); State ex rel. Baby
Girl Dunn, 133 Misc. 2d 399, 506 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986), reo'd,
125 A.D.2d 106, 512 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1st Dep't 1987); In re Baby Boy N., 150 Misc.
2d 535, 573 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1991); In re Adoption of
E.W.C., 89 Misc. 2d 64, 389 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1976); In re
Anonymous (T.W.C.) N.Y.L.J. Dec. 18, 1974, p. 17 col 6, affd, 48 A.D.2d 893, 369
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grounds that they never consented to the adoption or that their
consent was obtained improperly through fraud, coercion or
duress. Such adoption challenges do not serve the best interest
of the child or any party involved in the adoption process8
because they have the potential to frustrate the legislature's
goal of providing final, stable homes for children.'
The finality of adoption placements is critical because a
"continuous home environment is deemed essential to a child's
development as a healthy, stable human being.""0 It is also
important to finalize adoption relationships because parent-
child relationships implicate other legal rights, such as the
children's rights to inherit and the parties' rights to receive
governmental benefits." Besides frustrating the goal of fi-
nality of adoptions, adoption challenges also subject adoptive
and biological parents and the child to debilitating, traumatic
and expensive litigation.
Compliance with New York's statutory requirements
should be sufficient to guarantee that unwed birth mothers'
consents are informed, voluntary and final decisions. The New
York legislature has repeatedly revised the Domestic Relations
Law since 1961 in order to increase protection for biological
parents.' Despite these efforts, statutory compliance with the
N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dept), affd, 38 N.Y.2d 128, 341 N.E.2d 526, 379 N.YS.2d 1
(1975).
' See generally Robin DuRocher, Balancing Competing Interests in Post-Place-
nent Adoption Custody Disputes: How Do the Scales of Justice Weigh the Rights of
Biological Parents, Adoptive Parents, & Children?, 15 J. LEG. LIED. 305, 306
(1994).
' See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b(1)(a)(i-iv) & 384-b(l)(b) (MKinney 1992).
The legislature finds that "children [who] grow up with a normal family lifM in a
permanent home [have] . . . the best opportunity... to develop and thrive.! Thus
"when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal
family home for the child ... a permanent alternative home should be sought for
the child." Id.
"DuRocher, supra note 8, at 330; see Janet H. Dickson, The Emerging Rights
of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter? 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 917, 927 (1991).
u Robert 0. v. Russell IK, 80 N.Y.2d 254, 269, 604 N.E.2d 99, 106, 590
N.Y.S.2d 37, 44 (1992) (Titone, J., concurring).
See In re Baby Boy N., 150 Afisc. 2d 535, 573 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Far. Ct. N.Y.
County 1991). Prior to 1961 the Domestic Relations Law provided little guidance
to biological parents regarding the necessary procedures and content of adoption
consents. Since 1961, however, the New York legislature, being "sensitive to the
potential for abuse in private placement adoptions," has repeatedly intensified its
scrutiny of all phases of the required adoption procedures. Id. at 536, 573
N.Y.S.2d at 244. Although § 115 of the New York Domestic Relations Law was
19951
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existing consent requirements does not guarantee that unwed
mothers are protected against coercive, fraudulent and decep-
tive practices." Deficiencies in New York's Domestic Rela-
tions Law must be remedied to better protect the rights of
birth parents, to prevent subsequent litigation of parental con-
sent, and to preserve the finality of adoptive placements.
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws 4 promulgated a comprehensive model adoption
code known as the Uniform Adoption Act 5 (the "UAA"). The
most recent official draft of the UAA recommends procedural
guidelines to govern every aspect of the adoption process. It is
time for the New York legislature to re-examine its adoption
scheme 6 and to revise its consent requirements to better dis-
suade challenges.
Part I of this Note will analyze New York's statutory adop-
tion procedures, focusing on consent requirements for biological
parents.'7 Part II will illustrate that New York courts, eager
enacted to regulate the execution of parental consents in private-placement adop-
tions, it failed to specify either the form or content of the consent. Seeking to
provide further guidance, the legislature revised the statute in 1972 to add § 115-
b, which created two forms of consent (judicial and extrajudicial) and required
judges to inform birth parents of the consequences of executing a consent. Because
these consents were described in general terms, the legislature again amended §
115-b in 1986 to provide extensive details of the adoption procedures. The 1986
amendments distinguished the effects of the two different forms of consent, man-
dated that the consent advise natural parents of their right to have both indepon-
dent legal representation and supportive counseling, and required specific print-size
for extrajudicial consents. Id. at 536-38, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 245-46.
13 See, e.g., State ex rel. Baby Girl Dunn, 512 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (lst Dep't 1987)
("[t]he surrender agreement cannot withstand the factual features of estoppel or
duress or even perhaps fraud which are suggested by the circumstances herein
presented.").
1, The National Conference of Commissioners (the "Conference"), a Chicago-
based state organization comprised of 300 influential judges, lawyers, law profes-
sors and state officials, seeks to promote uniformity on nationwide issues by creat-
ing model legislation for state legislatures to modify, ratify and adopt. The Confer-
ence has played a crucial role in the development and enactment of state legisla-
tion such as the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Probate Code, and the
Uniform Partnership Act. Hansen, supra note 4, at 62.
UNIFOIM ADOPTION ACT (Proposed Official Draft 1994).
16 See N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 110 (defining adoption), §§ 111 & illa (specify-
ing notice and consent requirements), §§ 112 & 113 (governing agency adoptions),
§ 114 (governing the order of adoption), §§ 115 & 115-b (governing private place-
ments & revocation of parental consent to adoption), and § 117 (governing the
effect of adoption and grounds for adoption challenges) (McKinney 1988).
1 See infra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
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to promote finality, are reluctant to engage in individual factu-
al inquiries concerning coercion and duress when unwed
mothers' challenged consents comply with statutory require-
ments. 8 Part H will also review recent adoption challenges
brought by biological mothers in order to illustrate that New
Yorks current adoption consent requirements do not adequate-
ly protect the rights of unwed birth mothers. Finally, Part HI
of this Note will recommend that the New York State Legisla-
ture amend the current Domestic Relations Law in light of the
recently proposed UAA to provide better protection for unwed
birth mothers and to promote the finality of adoptions. Al-
though the UAA has not yet been introduced before the New
York legislature,'9 its proposals can be instrumental in assist-
ing New York to achieve necessary reform regarding consent
requirements. New York can better ensure the finality of adop-
tions by revising the Domestic Relations Law to provide addi-
tional safeguards for unwed mothers executing adoption con-
sents.0
I. NEW YoRK's ADoPTIoN SCHEm
The Domestic Relations Law generally governs the adop-
tion process in New York.2' In order to comprehend the inade-
quacies inherent in New York's adoption consent requirements,
it is necessary to provide an overview of that law's parental
' See infra notes 72-82, 100-102 and accompanying text.
"Telephone Interview with Katie Robinson, Legislative Assistant, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, Chicago I. (Feb. 17, 1995). The
Michigan legislature has adopted virtually all of the provisions of the 1993 Uni-
form Adoption Act Draft (the "UAA7). In addition, the UAA has been introduced
for debate before legislatures in Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma and Ver-
mont. Id.
2Although the UAA provides procedural guidelines governing every aspect of
the adoption process, this Note will focus primarily on the UAA's requirements
relating to parental consent to adoption. These include provisions regarding whan
a birth mother may execute consent, counseling options for birth mothers prior to
executing consent and mandatory representation by independent counreL See UNI-
FORM ADOPTION AcT §§ 2-203, 2-401, 2-402, 2-404, 2-405, 2-406, 2.407, 2-408, 3-
402, 3-403, 3-404, 3-405 (Proposed Official Draft 1994).
2 N.Y. Dom. REL LAW §§ 110-117 (McTanney 1988). The Domestic Relations
Law governs adoption procedures in general and private-placement adoptions in
particular. Agency adoptions in New York, however, are governead by both N.Y.
DoM. REL LAW §§ 112 & 113 (Mceinney 1988 & Supp. 1995), and by N.Y. SOc.
SERV. LAw §§ 383-c, 384, 384-c & 385 (Minney 1992 & Supp. 1995).
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consent procedures.
The Domestic Relations Law provides two forms of adop-
tion: agency adoption and private placement.' Whereas agen-
cy adoptions are primarily arranged between unrelated per-
sons,' private placement adoptions are frequently achieved
through the independent actions of the natural and adoptive
parents and a "facilitator," who is often a "neutral" third party
lawyer or doctor. 4 The facilitator becomes acquainted with
childless married couples and unmarried pregnant women
seeking to give up their children,' interacts with both sepa-
rately to arrange an adoption and receives a standard fee for
his or her services."
Once an unwed birth mother has made a decision to place
her child up for adoption and has coordinated the preliminary
arrangements, she must execute a parental consent to the
adoption in order to terminate any existing rights and respon-
sibilities regarding the child.Y Some states mandate a statu-
tory waiting period after the child's birth before parental con-
sent can be executed. Generally, this waiting period extends
for several days after the child's birth to allow the unwed birth
mother time to make a thoughtful, informed decision.s Cur-
' An overwhelming majority of states, including New York, recognize both pri-
vate-placement and agency adoptions. Only Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts,
Michigan and North Dakota have declared private-placement adoptions illegal. See
Dickson, supra note 10, at 925 n.42. Opponents of independent adoptions argue
that one who facilitates a private placement cannot have the time or the resources
to properly evaluate the adoptive parents. FARMER, supra note 1, at 62.
' The adoption agency is responsible for directly obtaining the natural parent's
or legal guardian's consent and for subsequently locating a suitable environment
for the child. FARMER, supra note 1, at 31-32.
U Other categories of independent adoptions consist of both intra-family adop-
tions (children adopted by blood relatives or by interested couples discovered by
blood relatives or friends) and black market adoptions (babies illegally sold for a
considerable profit). FARMER, supra note 1, at 61-62.
FARMER, supra note 1, at 61-62.
Facilitators who are doctors are entitled to fees for medical services, which
include the childbirth delivery fee. FARMER, supra note 1, at 62. Similarly, attor-
neys representing prospective adoptive parents are entitled to the reasonable and
actual fees charged for consultations and legal services such as the preparation
and filing of the adoption papers. See In re Male Infant B., 96 A.D.2d 1055, 1056,
466 N.Y.S.2d 482, 483 (2d Dep't 1983).
21 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1988).
28 See W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(A)(1) (1995) ("The consent or relinquishment is
executed after the expiration of seventy-two hours after the birth of the child
.... "); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Michie 1991) ("In no case shall . . . a
[Vol. 61: 931
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rently, New York's adoption scheme does not impose any such
period. Therefore, an unwed mother may even terminate her
rights prior to the child's birth.
In New York, a birth mother may execute consent in one
of two ways: before a judge or surrogate,' or extrajudicial-
ly.' When an unwed mother executes her consent to adoption
in the presence of a judge or surrogate, the judicial consent be-
comes irrevocable immediately." Immediate finality is justi-
fied because at the time of execution the court informs the
unwed birth mother of the consequences of the decision and of
her rights to obtain supportive counseling and the advice of an
independent attorney.' The court also has the opportunity to
evaluate the birth mother's understanding of the consequence
of executing the consent form.' If, however, a mother chooses
to execute an extrajudicial consent (i.e., outside of the courtes
presence), the consent does not become final until after forty-
five days have elapsed?' In addition to meeting the require-
ments of the judicial consent, the extrajudicial consent must
also contain a statement that the birth mother was informed of
her right to obtain an independent attorney, her right to sup-
portive counseling and the effects of a revocation of the con-
sent.a During this forty-five day period, the birth mother may
at any time give notice to the court of her intention to revoke
the consent.36
consent for [an] adoption be held valid if ... given prior to the fifth day after the
birth of the child."); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-220.3(c) (Mlchie 1995) ("When... the
adoptive child is at least ten days old, the birth parent or parents ... shall exe-
cute consent to the proposed adoption . .. ."); WA. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.160
(West 1986) (7he consent vil not be presented to the court until forty-eight
hours . . . after birth of the child . . . ").
2' N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115-b(2) (Mcinney 1988).
3 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(3)(a) (Alcfnney 1988). An extrajudicial consent
to adoption is a consent executed by the adoptee's birth parent outside the pres-
ence of a judge or surrogate.
31 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115-b(2) (McKinney 1988).
m N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115-b(2)Cb) (BMc~nney 1988).
' See In re Ricardo N., 195 A.D.2d 559, 600 N.Y.S.2d 730 (2d Dep't 1993)
(Appellate court refused to vacate judicial consent despite the lower court's failure
affirmatively to explain to unwed mother that her execution of a judicial content
precluded her from relying on the forty-five day revocation period provided in a
simultaneously executed extrajudicial consent).
31' N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115-b(4)(v) (McKenney 1988).
"s N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115-b(2)(b) (Mcmney 1988).
25 1&
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Once the court has obtained the necessary parental con-
sent(s),? the adoptive parents' attorney prepares and files a
lengthy adoption petition. This petition recites facts to show
that the parties have complied with all statutory require-
ments.' Even while the adoptive parents await an order of
adoption from the court, an unwed birth mother who has exe-
cuted an extrajudicial consent may revoke her consent if she
gives notice to the court within the forty-five day statutory
period.39 If the adoptive parents do not oppose the revocation,
the child is returned to the unwed birth mother." If, however,
the adoptive parents oppose the notice, timely revocation in
itself does not automatically guarantee the return of the child
to the birth mother. Instead, revocation triggers a "best inter-
est of the child" hearing 41 in which the court determines who
' If a parental consent to an adoption is executed by only one parent, the
court must then determine if consent is required from the other birth parent.
Whereas the New York Domestic Relations Law always requires the natural
mothers consent to validate an adoption, N.Y. DoM. EEL. LAW §§ 111(1)(b) &
111(1)(c) (McKinney 1988), the legislature has established separate criteria to de-
termine whether a father's consent is required. Although a father's consent is
mandatory if a child is conceived or born within a marriage, his consent is not
required if the child is born out of wedlock unless the court finds that he has
maintained "substantial and continuous contact with the child." N.Y. DOM. EL.
LAW § 111(lXa) (McKinney 1988). "Substantial and continuous contact" will be
established if an unwed father visits the child monthly, regularly communicates
with the child, files with the putative father registry, assists the unwed mother
with prenatal medical care and holds himself out to be the infant's father. N.Y.
DOM. EEL. LAW § 111(e) (McKinney 1988). See also In re Raquel Marie X, 76
N.Y.2d. 387, 408, 559 NE.2d 418, 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 865, cert. denied, 498
U.S. 986 (1990).
See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 112 (standards and mandatory contents for
agency adoption petitions) & 115 (standards and mandatory contents for private-
placement adoption petitions) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1995). In general, adoption
petitions for both private and agency adoptions contain information regarding the
identity of the child, how the adoption was arranged, biographical information
about the adoptive parents such as their occupation, religious faith and marital
status and affidavits enumerating economic compensation associated with the adop-
tion such as the child's prenatal care, the unwed birth mother's medical bills,
reimbursements for travel and lawyers' compensation fees for private placement
adoptions. Id.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115(b)(3)(b) (McKinney 1988).
Id.
" The court cannot employ any presumption in favor of the biological parent(s)
when determining the best interest of the child. N.Y. DoM. EEL. LAW § 115-
b(6)(dXv) (McKinney 1988). Since the "rights of the [biological] parent to custody
shall not be superior to those of the adoptive parent," N.Y. DOM. EEL. LAW § 115-
b(4)(a)(iv) (McKinney 1988), the court is compelled to place both the adoptive and
[Vol. 61: 931
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shall receive custody.' After the execution of a judicial con-
sent, or after the expiration of an extrajudicial consents forty-
five day revocation period, courts are precluded from vacating
a final adoption consent absent proof that the consent was pro-
cured through fraud, duress or coercion. 3
This adoption scheme does not adequately prevent unwed
mothers from challenging adoptions. The current statute falls
short of the New York legislature's goals of promoting the best
interests of the child, protecting the rights of both unwed birth
mothers and adoptive parents and maintaining an adoption
process which is fair, efficient, prompt and final. The statute
fails because it does not contain sufficiently specific regulatory
requirements and because New York courts refuse to interpret
the requirements set forth in the statute to maximize the wel-
fare of the child. Instead, New York courts presume that statu-
tory compliance is the equivalent of providing adequate protec-
tion.
II. ADOPTIoN CHALLENGES IN NEW YORK
A. Evolution of New York Courts' Analysis of Challenged
Adoption Consents: The Statutory-Compliance Approach
When an unwed mother consents to put her child up for
adoption, she has agreed to sever all ties with her child
natural parents on equal footing.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw §§ 115-b(6)(d)(iv) & (v) (hiclmiy 1988). "[EinauraI
status, character, mental and physical health, ability to provide for the child's
needs, available support from extended family members, continuity and stability,
and capacity to accept the child," are among the factors New York courts consider
in determining the best interests of the child. In re Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, 233,
487 N.E.2d 241, 245, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384, 388 (1985), cort. denied, 475 U.S. 1108
(1986).
,3 N.Y. Dol. REL. LAW § 115-b(7) (hc.mnaey 1988).
" Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983); In re Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223,
234, 487 N.E.2d 241, 246, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384, 389 (1985), cert. denied, 475 Us.
1108 (1986); In re Baby Boy N., 150 Misc. 2d 535, 536, 573 N.Y.S.2d 244, 244
(Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1991).
" In re Ricardo N., 195 A.D.2d 559, 559, 600 N.YS.2d 730, 731 (2d Dep't
1993) (extrajudicial consent affidavit form states, "I ... fully realize that I will
finally lose all legal rights in and to the said minor as soon as this documant and
accompanying papers are signed). Prior to executing a consent, the surrogate
must specifically inform the biological parent that after his or hr appearance
1995]
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Sometimes, however, unwed birth mothers who have relin-
quished custody of their infants seek to reestablish their pa-
rental ties by claiming that their consents were procured
through fraud, duress and coercion.46 New York courts facing
these claims have the difficult task of ascertaining, through
hindsight, whether an unwed mother who previously made a
voluntary, well-informed decision has had a change of heart, or
whether the mother was a victim of fraud due to inadequate
protection at the time of execution? and thus never truly con-
sented to the adoption in the first place. According to the law,
only the second scenario can justify overturning the challenged
adoption. This, however, was not always the case in New York.
In the last two decades, the New York courts have altered
their approach in resolving adoption challenges brought by
unwed mothers. In the past, New York courts were sympathet-
ic towards unwed mothers and liberally accepted evidence of
both emotional turmoil and mistakes of fact as sufficient to
vacate an adoption consent.48
In Musso v. McAlpine,9 an appellate court vacated an
unwed mother's adoption consent on the ground that the pres-
ence of emotional turmoil rendered the consent involuntary.
The court held that because the unwed mother had been a
"very frightened girl" at the time of surrender, her decision
before the court, he or she will have nothing further to say in regard to the child.
Id.
" See In re Amanda B., 206 A.D.2d 636, 614 N.Y.S.2d 607 (3d Dop't 1994); In
re Female R., 202 AJ).2d 672, 609 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dep't 1994); In re Baby Girl
J., 192 A.D.2d 533, 595 N.Y.S.2d 816 (2d Dep't 1993); In re Ricardo N., 195
A.D.2d 559, 600 N.Y.S.2d 730 (2d Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 661,
625 N.E.2d 591, 605 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1993); In re Adoption of Baby Boy "B"., 163 AfD.
2d 673, 558 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't 1990); In re Adoption of Samuel, 167 AfD. 2d
909, 562 N.Y.S.2d 278 (4th Dep't 1990); In re Baby Girl Z., 154 A.D.2d 471, 646
N.Y.S.2d 941 (2d Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y. 2d 709, 554 N.E.2d 1279,
555 N.Y.S. 2d 691 (1990); In re Sarah K., 110 A.D.2d 18, 492 N.Y.S.2d 957 (2d
Dep't), rev'd 66 N.Y.2d 223, 487 N.E.2d 241, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
' Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 488, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157, 429 N.Y.S.2d
592, 596, (1980) ("For courts to attempt through hindsight to sort out the inten-
tions of the parties and affix jural significance to their conduct .. . runs too great
a risk of error.").
48 See, e.g., Musso v. McAlpine, 36 AD.2d 901, 321 N.Y.S.2d 287 (4th Dep't
1971); In re Emmanuel T., 81 Misc. 2d 535, 365 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Far. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975); .
36 A.D.2d 901, 321 N.Y.S.2d 287 (4th Dep't 1971).
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was "not made willingly, but only as a result of circumstances
which [she] believed left her no other choice.' Reconizing
that the unwed birth mother had expressed concern for the
baby and had engaged in a lengthy search for the child after
changing her mind, the court reasoned her conduct did not
support a "settled purpose to be rid of all [her] parental obliga-
tions."51
Similarly, in In re Emmanuel T., a New York family court
vacated an unwed mother's consent because it interpreted her
consent as having been based upon a factual misrepresenta-
tion.52 In Emmanuel T., the unwed mother agreed to have her
child adopted by a couple whom she had never met. She was
told only basic information about the adoptive parents by their
attorney, such as their economic, religious and moral circum-
stances. When the unwed mother appeared in court to exe-
cute the adoption consent, she learned for the first time that
the adoptive mother was sixty-three years old and that her
husband was fifty-six years old." The unwed mother executed
the consent form,' but later sought to revoke it claiming that
she had acted under "bewilderment and distress," and that if
she had known of the adoptive parents' ages prior to the hear-
ing she never would have consented.' The court held that her
consent was not "truly voluntary" because it had been based on
a mistake of fact.57 Relying on Musso v. McAlpine, the court
also concluded that the consent was involuntary because the
unwed mother was a "very frightened young girl," who had
acted under great pressure while in a confused and disturbed
state.
New York courts have since rejected the notion that emo-
tional turmoil constitutes duress or coercion such as to warrant
reversing an adoption order. 9 In In re Baby Bay L., Nicole, a
' Id. at 902, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
"idc
In re Emmanuel T., 81 ffisc. 2d 535, 365 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Faro. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975).
" Id. at 537, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
"Id,
Emmanul T., 81 Mlisc. 2d at 538, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
See In re Baby Boy L., 144 A.D.2d 674, 534 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1938),
19951
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
seventeen year-old, unmarried high school student gave birth
and then executed a consent to adoption." Although a New
York family court vacated her consent upon finding that "pres-
sures upon Nicole seriously interfered with [her] judgment and
ability to make an independent, knowing and voluntary con-
sent,"61 the appellate court reversed. Despite evidence that
the teenager had misgivings about the adoption and executed a
consent form because her mother threatened to throw her into
the street if she kept the baby, the appellate court declared
that "parental consents to adoption have consequences and
cannot be undone at will."6'2 Although the court recognized
that "Nicole was confronted by an emotionally difficult choice,"
it held that she had voluntarily elected to defer to her mother's
wishes. Because Nicole's "decision to proceed with the adop-
tion was, instead, reflective of her express desire to remain
with her parents," the court concluded that her consent was
voluntary.6"
New York courts also consider parental threats, pressure
by the surrendering mother's family, advice by the surrender-
ing parent's physician and depression of the unwed mother as
insufficient to overturn the release of a child for adoption."
One appellate court decision, frequently quoted by other New
York courts, addressed unwed mothers' emotional trauma
surrounding such consent decisions with the following stern
words:
Contemplation of the surrender of one's own child is, in many if not
all cases a cause of emotional and mental stress .... No statute has
said that surrenders are valid only if executed free from emotion,
tensions and pressures caused by the situation. No principle of law
requires the rule. A balance of interests of the persons concerned
and society weighs strongly against it.66
appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 606, 541 N.E.2d 427, 543 N.Y.S.2d 398, cert. denied, 493
U.S. 918 (1989).
60 Id. at 675, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
61 Id. at 675, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
02 Id.
Id. at 676, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
Baby Boy L., 144 A.D.2d at 676, 534 N.Y.S. 2d at 708.
Id. at 675, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (quoting Podomore v. Our Lady of Victory
Infant Home, 82 A.D.2d 48, 51, 442 N.Y.S.2d 334 (4th Dep't 1981)), appeal denied,
74 N.Y.2d 606, 541 N.E.2d 427, 543 N.Y.S.2d 398, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 918
(1989)).
" In re Anonymous, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 18, 1974 at 17, (quoting In re Surrender of
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Similarly, New York courts are no longer amenable to
vacating final consents based on mistakes regarding material
facts. The appellate court in In re Baby Girl Z. avoided vacat-
ing a consent based on a mistake of fact by rephrasing the
material issue involved in order to preserve finality and cer-
tainty in adoption proceedings.' In Baby Girl Z., a devout Lu-
theran unwed mother challenged her extrajudicial consent on
grounds that the adoptive parents had fraudulently concealed
the adoptive father's Jewish religion. The birth mother had
originally wanted her child to be raised Lutheran, but agreed
that it could be raised in the Catholic faith.' The birth moth-
er sought additional assurances and was repeatedly guaran-
teed by the adoptive parents and their attorney that the child
would "be raised as a Catholic in a Christian home. '  Be-
cause the surrogate court found that the adoptive parents were
aware of the importance of the Christian religion to the birth
mother, it held that their failure to divulge the adoptive
father's Jewish background constituted fraudulent concealment
and justified vacating the consent. 0 The appellate court, how-
ever, disagreed. The appellate court disregarded evidence of
the unwed mother's strong desire regarding her child's reli-
gious upbringing and upheld the consent, rephrasing the ma-
terial issue upon which the unwed mother's consent was based
as "the concern of the birth mother as to the religion in which
the child was to be raised and not the religious heritage of the
adoptive [parents]."7
Because New York courts no longer consider an unwed
mother's emotional turmoil or mistake in executing a con-
sent 2 when faced with challenges to adoption consents, New
Minor Children, 181 NX.2d 836, 839 (Mass. 1962)), affid, 48 A.D.?A 893, 369
N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dept.), affd, 38 N.Y.2d 128, 341 N.E.2d 526, 379 N.Y.S.2cl 1
(1975).
In re Baby Girl Z., 154 A.D.2d 471, 545 N.Y.S.2d 941 (2d Dapt 1939).
Id. at 471, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 942.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 472, 545 N.Y.S.2cl at 942.
Id. at 473, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 943 (emphasis added).
In re Sarah K., 66 N.Y.2d 223, 241, 487 N.E.2d 241, 250, 496 N.Y.S2d. 384,
393 (1985) ("Moreover, neither emotional distress nor mistahe is a ground for
vitiating consent under Domestic Relations Law.., ."), cert. denicd, 475 U.S. 1108
(1986).
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York courts must only ascertain whether the consent was the
product of coercion or duress. 3 In determining the presence of
coercion and duress, it appears that New York courts apply a
bright-line "statutory compliance" approach to decide whether
an unwed mother's consent was voluntary. This approach re-
quires a court to decide only whether the unwed mother's con-
sent complies with the required procedures set forth in the
adoption statute.74 Whenever statutory consent requirements
have not been met," or whenever legislatively mandated
adoption procedures have been blatantly violated," courts
have no difficulty vacating a parental consent or reversing an
order of adoption. When executed final consents do comply
with New York's statutory requirements, however, courts are
reluctant to inquire into individual circumstances surrounding
the execution of the consent or to interpret the specific require-
ments in the statute.
Thus, New York courts tend to uphold an unwed mother's
consent whenever it appears that she has had the benefits of
either counseling"1 or representation by an attorney, 8 or
73 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115-b(7) (McKinney 1988).
' See In re "Female" R., 202 A.D.2d 672, 672, 609 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (2d Dep't
1994) ("The surrender agreement, which was effectuated in the manner required
by statute, was valid and irrevocable."); see also, In re Baby Boy "B"., 163 A.D.2d
673, 674, 558 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (3d Dep't 1990), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 710,
564 N.E.2d 672, 563 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1991).
71 In re Male Infant L., 61 N.Y.2d 420, 426, 462 N.2d 1165, 1168, 474
N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (1984) (court denied foster parents' request for best-interests
hearing despite physical custody of child, since unwed mother had not complied
with consent procedures); Dennis T. v. Joseph C., 82 A.D.2d 125, 131-132, 441
N.Y.S.2d 477, 481 (2d Dep't) (court vacated adoption where natural mother's sign-
ing of incomplete consent form prior to giving birth was invalid), appeal denied, 55
N.Y.2d 603, 431 NB.2d 977, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1981); State ex rel. Dunn v.
Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children, 133 Misc. 2d 399, 506 N.Y.S.2d
805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986), (court vacated consent where agency failed to
comply with New York Social Services Law § 384(3), which requires consent be
acknowledged and recorded) rev'd, 125 A.D.2d 106, 512 N.Y.S.2d 82 (let Dep't
1987).
"' In re Adoption of Samuel, 167 A.D.2d 909, 562 N.Y.S.2d 278 (4th Dep't
1990), appeal granted sub nom., In re Samuel, 77 N.Y.2d 804, 571 N.E.2d 82, 568
N.Y.S. 2d 912 (1991). In Samuel, the appellate court vacated an adoption order
where, before the parental consent became effective, the birth mother communicat-
ed to her attorney her desire to withdraw her adoption consent and where the at-
torney disregarded the mother's instructions, and obtained custody of the infant in
violation of § 371[1],[2] of the New York Social Services Law.
" See In re Commissioner of Social Serv., 141 A.D.2d 821, 529 N.Y.S.2d 883
(2d Dep't 1988); see also In re Baby Girl B., 144 Misc. 2d 583, 554 N.Y.S,2d 963
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when the court is satisfied that the unwed mother received
and understood the court's full explanation regarding the im-
port of her actions. 9 For example, in In re Female R., where
the unwed mother had received a thorough explanation of the
gravity of her consent, had been represented by an attorney
and had been advised of her right to counseling, the court
refused to inquire whether her consent was voluntary and up-
held the adoption.'0
The extremity of the courts' reliance on statutory compli-
ance is illustrated in In re Baby Girl J." In Baby Girl J., the
appellate court upheld a parental consent by conclusively stat-
ing that "the consent had been given with full knowledge of the
consequences and had not been procured through fraud, coer-
cion or undue influence" without providing any factual analysis
in its opinion of the circumstances surrounding the execu-
tion.' The court's reluctance to provide a factual basis for its
opinion illustrates its aversion to examining individual circum-
stances and preference for assuming that statutory compliance
is an adequate measure of an informed, voluntary choice.
This distinct shift in the New York courts' attitude to-
wards unwed mothers can be attributed to both society's
changed social values regarding parental rights and New York
(Sur. Ct. Monroe County 1989) (denying nineteen year-old unwed mothera petition
to vacate her consent since the consent was freely and voluntarily given in the
hospital in the presence of her attorney and after counseling by an experienced,
though uncertified, hospital social worker), affd, 161 AD.2d 1201, 558 N.Y.S.2
875 (1st Dept 1990).
In re Baby Boy B. 163 A.D.2d 673, 558 N.YS.2d 281 (3d Dept), appeal
denied, 76 N.Y.2d 710, 564 NR.2d 672, 563 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1990).
' See In re Amanda 'B", 206 A.D.2d 636, 614 N.Y.S.2d 607 (3d Dap't 1994)
(appellate court upheld consent where "[family court] determined ... the execu-
tion... was voluntary by making careful inquiry regarding [unwed mother'a]
state of mind and understanding of the legal consequences of her action.");
Margensey v. Manitta, 156 A.D.2d 1026, 549 N.Y.S.2d 307 (4th Dep't 1989) (judi-
cial consent upheld where surrogate fully explained consent was irrevocable and
mother recited consent was product of her own free will, despite fact that adoptive
parents! attorney told unwed mother she had six months to change her mind); In
re Adoption of E.W.C., 89 Misc. 2d 64, 389 N.Y.S.2 743 (Sur. Ct Nassau County
1976) (upholding irrevocable consent over unwed mothers argument that she relied
on adoptive parents' promise of visiting rights where surrogate expressly informed
unwed mother that consents could not be conditional and where mother affirma-
tively stated that her execution of consent was voluntary).
In re Female R., 202 AD.2d 672, 609 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d Dept 1994).
' 192 A.D.2d 533, 595 N.Y.S.2d 816 (2d Dep't 1993).
2 Id.
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courts' reliance on the legislature's efforts to provide additional
protection for birth parents. In 1972, the New York legislature
abandoned its traditional parental-presumption rule which
deemed the status of biological parental rights superior to
those of adoptive parents and which directed the courts to
accord great weight to birth parents' rights when determining
custody in adoption placements. Prior to 1972, a "natural"
mother who attempted to revoke consent to adoption usually
regained custody.s' There existed a prevalent assumption that
the best interests of a child would be served if it was raised by
its birth parents, unless the parent was disqualified by gross
misconduct." Thus, the adoption statute required courts to
apply a strong presumption in favor of biological parents in
determining the best interest of the child in adoption disputes
against third parties.'
Courts interpreting the parental presumption presumed
that "a mother's love" was one factor which would always en-
dure, "possibly after other claimed material advantages and
emotional attachments may have proven transient."86 A natu-
ral mother's change of heart was not considered "an evil
thing." 87 In fact, it was to be accorded great sympathy and, in
a proper case, encouragement and favorable action.' The sta-
tus of birth parents was so important in determining the best
interests of the child in adoption disputes that they could coun-
83 Nancy Mandelker Frieden, The Constitutional Rights of Natural Parents
Under New York State Adoption Statutes, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 617
(1984); see also Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents
in Child Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 454-55 (1976) [hereinafter
"Child's Best Interests"]; Comment, Revocation of Parental Consent to Adoption:
Legal Doctrine and Social Policy, 28 U. OH. L. REV. 564, 566-67 (1961) [heroinaf.
ter "Revocation"].
" Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 204, 274 NSE.2d 431,
436, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 941 (1971).
" See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(1) (McKinney 1995), cited in People ex. rel
Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 192, 269 N-E.2d 787,
791, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70, cert. denied. 404 U.S. 805 (1971).
People v. Free Synagogue Child Adoption Comm., 194 Misc. 332, 337-38, 85
N.Y.S.2d 541, 546 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), appeal dismissed, 275 A.D.2d 828, 91
N.Y.S.2d 926 (lst Dep't 1949).
' Spence-Chapin Adoption Ser.., 28 N.Y.2d at 194, 269 N.E.2d at 792, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 72, (quoting People ex. rel. Anonymous v. New York Foundling Hosp.,
17 A.D.2d 122, 125, 232 N.Y.S.2d 479, 483 (1st Dep't) affd, 12 N.Y.2d 863, 187
NXE.2d 791, 237 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1962)).
es Id.
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terbalance, even outweigh, superior material and cultural
advantages which adoptive parents may have been able to
provide.
8 9
In 1972, the New York Court of Appeals decision in People
ex. reL Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service,' radi-
cally transformed society's attitude towards the parental pre-
sumption. In Scarpetta, the unwed birth mother notified the
adoption agency of her intent to revoke her consent to the
adoption five days after surrendering her child to the agen-
cy.91 The adoptive parents were prohibited from intervening
in the adoption and were never informed by the agency of the
revocation until eight months later when the child had become
an integral part of their family.9 The court, applying the pa-
rental presumption, ordered the infant returned to the birth
mother.
93
The decision outraged the public, struck terror in the
hearts of prospective adoptive parents, and discouraged others
from entertaining adoption as an alternative." Society began
to recognize the need for finality in adoption placements."
Society also began to gain sympathy for adoptive parents and
adopted children whose lives could be disrupted by birth par-
ents whom the law favored in custody battles!' Moreover,
fear existed that dislodging a child from its adoptive home
could cause trauma to the child or impede his or her develop-
ment. Consequently, the New York State Legislature, recog-
nizing the need to "provide stronger guarantees of the perma-
nence of child adoption arrangements,"3 amended the Domes-
tic Relations Law in 1972 to eliminate the parental presump-
tion and mandated that adoptive parents be "placed on equal
Free Synagogue Child Adoption Committee, 194 hrmc. at 335, 85 N.YS.2d at
544.54 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N3E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, cert. denied., 404 Us. 805
(1971).
"Id, at 189, 269 N9.2cd at 789, 321 N.Y.S.2cl at 67.
Id at 195-96, 269 N.E.2d at 796, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 72-74.
Id. at 193, 269 N.E.2d at 792, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 7L
Frieden, supra note 83, at 623-24.
Fzieden, supra note 83, at 624.
Frieden, supra note 83, at 624.
Child's Best Interests, supra note 83, at 454-65; Revocation, supra note 83, at
567.
"Frieden, supra note 83, at 624 (citing Memorandum of Assemblyman Joaph
R. Pisani, New York Legislative Annual 1972 at 202, 203).
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footing" with birth parents in determining the best interest of
the child.99
Courts, no longer required to concentrate primarily on the
biological parents' fitness, were now able to focus their custody
decisions on whether the child would be better served by being
returned to the birth parent. Recognizing the importance of
finality to an adopted child's continuous development, courts
have assumed a tougher stance towards unwed birth mothers
seeking to revoke their consent.
The courts have justified this hardened attitude towards
unwed mothers by relying upon the legislature's repeated revi-
sions of the Domestic Relations Law in the last two decades to
provide safeguards for biological parents.0 0 Courts rely upon
the "far broader spectrum of formalities and protections for a
natural parent"1 ' provided in the Domestic Relations Law to
provide the benchmark of what constitutes a voluntary con-
sent. One appellate court has explicitly stated its reliance on
the current requirements with the following explanation:
Domestic Relations Law § 115-b provides the safeguards specified by
the Legislature to insure voluntariness and knowing consent. Since
the consent form complies with the statutory requirements and since
petitioner executed that form, there is no need for further inquiry into
that issue."
Since it is difficult for courts to ascertain through hind-
sight whether unwed birth mothers actually had enough pro-
tection at the time of consent, the current bright-line "statuto-
ry compliance" approach is necessary to preserve adoptions.
The current approach, however, promotes finality at the ex-
pense of the rights of unwed birth mothers because the re-
quirements are not sufficient to guarantee that unwed birth
mothers are protected.
Ch. 639 § 4, [1972] N.Y. Laws p. 1233, 1237.
100 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
101 In re Baby Boy N., 150 Misc. 2d 535, 538, 573 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (Faro. Ct.
N.Y. County 1991).
"' In re Baby Boy B., 163 A.D.2d 673, 674, 558 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (3d Dep't
1990) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 61: 931
UNIFORM ADOPTIONACT
B. Mandatory Procedures and Questionable Consents
New York courts ignore the fact that mere statutory com-
pliance with the current Domestic Relations Law may not
guarantee that unwed mothers have adequate protection at the
time of consent. Courts contend that compliance ensures that
parents are adequately protected because the legislature has
revised New York's adoption statutes in previous years with
the intent to provide additional safeguards for those executing
consent. The cases, however, belie this broad assumption. New
York courts have actually confronted situations in which un-
wed mothers executed parental consents according to mandato-
ry procedures, but where surrounding circumstances such as
the time of consent, the counseling received and the failure of
the birth mother to have legal representation rendered the
voluntary nature of the consent questionable at best.
1. Time of Consent
Because New York's adoption scheme currently does not
impose any statutory waiting period for the execution of paren-
tal consent, an unwed mother may consent to give up her child
at any time. The danger inherent in permitting termination of
parental rights at any time is that unwed mothers, burdened
by familial or financial pressures, may hastily consent to an
adoption prior to the child's birth, without considering fully the
ramifications of such a serious, life-long decision.
Although some birth mothers who execute consent either
upon discovering that they are pregnant or during some later
period of their pregnancies will not regret their decisions, it is
foreseeable that some birth parents who have made rash deci-
sions will change their minds once their child is born. Some of
these birth parents may even seek to challenge their consent
and, thus, potentially threaten the finality of the adoption. One
such challenge occurred in Dennis T. v. Joseph C."°
In Dennis T., Lisa, a sixteen-year-old unwed high school
student discovered she was pregnant."' After informing her
parents of her pregnancy, Lisa and her mother consulted her
s 82 AMD.2d 125, 441 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2d Dept 1981).
SId, at 126, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
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physician about the possibility of adoption.0 5 The physician
agreed to inquire whether any of his medical group's patients
were interested in adoption. Thereafter, Lisa, her parents and
the adoptive parents' attorney participated in a meeting where
Lisa, then eight months pregnant, signed a consent to her
unborn child's adoption.0 8 The consent form recited the un-
wed birth mother's understanding that she was giving her
final and irrevocable consent, that she would not be able to
regain custody of her child and that she would not be able to
maintain an action against the adoptive parents.'1>
Lisa gave birth to a son on November 6, 1980."8 The
child was delivered to the adoptive parents with her consent on
November 9, 1980.109 Forty days later, on December 19, 1980,
Lisa contacted the adoptive parents' attorney to inform him
that she had changed her mind and wanted the baby back.110
Subsequently, she brought a writ of habeas corpus to regain
custody of her child and was awarded custody."'
If an unwed mother executes a judicial consent to an adop-
tion prior to giving birth, any attempt to revoke her consent
after the child is born will be futile because the consent be-
comes irrevocable upon execution. Similarly, if an unwed moth-
er executes an extrajudicial consent prior to giving birth, the
statutory forty-five-day revocation period also may elapse ei-
ther prior to the child's birth, or soon after birth, but before
the unwed mother has changed her mind. The result, however,
is the same: the unwed birth mother will be foreclosed from
challenging her consent to adoption. For example, if not for the
technicality of the form of the unwed mother's extrajudicial
consent in Dennis T., she would not have been permitted to
revoke her consent. Approximately one-third of the forty-five-
day revocation window associated with extrajudicial consents
would have elapsed while the unwed birth mother was still
106 Id.
106 Id.
7o' Id. at 126-27, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79.
' Dennis T., 82 A.D.2d at 127, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
1069 Id. at 127, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
Uo Id. at 128, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
... Id. The appellate court vacated the unwed mother's consent because it doter-
mined that the form of the consent did not comply with statutory procedures. Id.
at 130-31, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 480-481.
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pregnant and would have expired on November 28, 1980. Thus,
the unwed birth mother's change of heart in December would
have occurred outside the revocation period and she would
have been precluded from revoking her consent, since no fraud,
duress or coercion existed.
The current Domestic Relations Law permits an unwed
birth mother to terminate her parental rights during her preg-
nancy. Because it is unclear whether a birth mother, who has
carried her child for nine months will change her mind about
adoption after her child is born, the legislature should amend
New York's adoption scheme to impose restrictions on when an
unwed mother can consent to adoption. This will both elim-
inate the unwed mothers' impulsive consents as well as pre-
serve commencement of the statutory revocation period for un-
wed mothers who do change their minds.
2. Counseling
New Yorks statutory scheme provides that courts must
inform parents who elect to execute either a judicial or extraju-
dicial consent of their right to obtain supportive counseling in
both private placement and agency adoptions.' Courts are
reluctant to interpret the current counseling requirement to
the extent of examining the nature of the counseling, unless
the circumstances are extreme.
In State ex. rel. Dunn v. Catholic Home Bureau for Depen-
dent Children, the appellate court vacated an unwed mother's
consent where evidence indicated that her counselors resorted
to outrageous conduct that constituted fraud, duress and coer-
cion in order to convince the unwed mother to surrender her
child."3 In Dunn, the unwed mother, who was in "dire
straits" financially and psychologically due to her pregnancy,
sought counseling from the Catholic Home Bureau
("CHIB")." 4 The unwed mother met with Sister Rosalie, a so-
cial worker for CHB, to discuss both her indecision over wheth-
er to keep her baby and the availability of a shelter."W Sister
n2 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 11-b(2)(b) (MUcinney 1988).
' State ex. rel. Dunn v. Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children, 125
A.D.2d 106, 512 N.Y.S.2d 82 (lt Dep't 1987).
", Id. at 107, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
Id. at 107-08, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
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Rosalie referred the mother to the Nazareth Life Center ("Naz-
areth"), one of several homes run by CHB for unwed mothers.
Sister Rosalie also informed the mother that if she chose to
keep her baby she would be required to pay rent, but that she
could reside there for free if she surrendered the child to CHB
for adoption."6 The mother stayed at Nazareth until after the
child was born."
Prior to the birth of her child, the unwed mother had nu-
merous counseling sessions with a social worker from Nazareth
where she repeatedly expressed her uncertainty."' The social
worker never explained that the unwed mother had the option
to place the child in foster care, that she could receive addi-
tional counseling, or that she could consult a lawyer."' On
the "traumatic day" before giving birth, the unwed mother
agreed to surrender the child to foster care and the social
worker visited her at the hospital to obtain her consent to
temporary foster care. This allowed the social worker to deliver
the infant to the "Does" until the unwed mother executed a
legal surrender.2 In the meantime, the unwed mother re-
vealed her situation to her family and, still uncertain as to
what to do, informed the social worker that she felt she needed
additional counseling.' Sister Rosalie gave the mother the
names of two counselors associated with CHB, and on the very
day that her counseling began, Sister Rosalie pressured the
mother to make a decision.2 2 Thereafter, Sister Rosalie ac-
cused her of stalling in signing the papers and the mother
yielded, provided she had thirty days to change her mind."
Sister Rosalie arranged a meeting at a busy Friendly's restau-
rant where, after an hour of discussion, the unwed mother
executed a legal adoption consent."m Subsequently, the un-
wed mother changed her mind and challenged her consent on
grounds of fraud, coercion and duress.' The appellate court
.. Id. at 108, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
11 Id.
22 Dunn, 125 A.D.2d at 108, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
u9 Id.
02 Id. at 108-09, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
-1 Id. at 109, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
322 Id.
' Dunn, 125 A.D.2d at 109, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
224 Id.
"' State ex. rel. Dunn v. Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children, 183
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reversed the trial court's findings and concluded that the sur-
render agreement could not "withstand the factual features of
estoppel or duress or even perhaps fraud which [were] suggest-
ed by the circumstances .... .'
In short, although the Domestic Relations Law provides
that birth parents are to be informed of their right to support-
ive counseling, the current statutory requirements fall short of
protecting unwed birth mothers from coercive influences. Al-
though courts should not be expected to engage in individual
factual inquiries to ascertain in hindsight what occurred dur-
ing confidential counseling sessions, the Domestic Relations
Law should be amended to prevent situations where unwed
mothers are counseled by persons who are employed by adop-
tion agencies that have an interest in securing their children
for placement.
3. Legal Representation
In New York, section 115-b(2)(b) of the Domestic Relations
Law provides that parental adoption consent forms must in-
form the birth parent of his or her right to be represented by
independent legal counsel of the party's own choice.' Prior
to 1989, it was common in privately arranged adoptions for un-
wed birth mothers' legal representation to be provided by the
attorney for the adoptive parents.' s This arrangement, creat-
ing an inherent conflict of interest, failed to provide adequate
protection for the unwed birth mother.
In 1987, the American Bar Association declared that, be-
cause the interests of adoptive and biological parents inher-
ently conflict and cannot be reconciled in private placement
adoptions, it is unethical for attorneys to represent both sides
in these highly emotional undertakings1  The unwed birth
Misc. 2d 399, 402, 506 N.Y.S 2d 805, 807 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 19S6).
" Dunn, 125 A.D.2d at 111, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 86. The court also vacated the
consent on grounds that CHB failed to have the consent admowledged and record-
ed as required by § 384(3) of the New York Social Services Law. Ad.
m N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115-b(2)(b) (MeKinney 1988).
m N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 374 Joseph F. Carrieri, Practice Commentaries
(McKinney 1992) at 449, 451.
' ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 1523 (1987) (si-
multaneous representation of adoptive and biological parents in private adoption
proceeding).
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mother should be entitled to have her lawyer fully disclose the
irrevocable consequences of the adoption. She should also be
able to expect his or her advice on how to revoke the consent,
should she wish to do so. At the same time, though, the lawyer
who simultaneously represents the adoptive parents has a duty
to them, his clients, to secure final consent and to avoid revo-
cation, a duty which conflicts with the duty to the unwed
mother.13
The existence of the potential dangers associated with
simultaneous representation of both sides of an adoption were
illustrated by the outrageous conduct of infamous New York
private adoption attorney Stanley B. Michelman. Michelman
on three separate occasions had coordinated adoptions between
adoptive and biological parents, and in some instances repre-
sented both parties. 3' He arranged for the physical transfers
of the infants to occur in hospital parking lots where the adop-
tive parents would pay over necessary "fees."3 ' He represent-
ed to one unwed birth mother that the adoption arrangement
could easily be reversed with a phone call, but when she
changed her mind, he neglected to return her phone calls.1"
Michelman was indicted in Suffolk and New York counties for
illegally obtaining twenty-four babies from poor women on
false pretenses and "baby selling,"" but was later acquitted
when adoptive parents, fearful of losing their adopted children,
refused to testify against him." Simultaneously, the Com-
mittee on Grievances of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York reviewed his practice of dual representation. 3 '
" Id. See also, id. at n.4, State Bar of Michigan Opinion 156, 9/53; New York
State Bar Association Opinion 68, 118/68; North Carolina State Bar Opinion 38,
7/25/47; But see, CAL. CIM. CODE § 225m (West 1982) (simultaneous representation
of biological and adoptive parents in adoption matters is permissible if both par-
ties execute a written consent); N.Y.S.BA. Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 584
(1987) (stating that it is ethically improper for an attorney to represent both a
potential surrogate mother and an intermediary in a surrogacy arrangement).
1 People v. Michelman, 93 Misc. 2d 297, 298, 403 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1978).
"2 Id., See also, Paul Vitello, Fighting for Justin, NEWSDAY, May 15, 1994, at
A3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newsday File.
Vitello, supra note 132, at A3.
"' Vitello, supra note 132, at A3.
"' Paul Vitello, On Dangers Unforeseen, NEWSDAY, June 14, 1994, at A6, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Newsday File.
" In re Stanley B. Michelman, 202 A.D.2d 87, 91, 616 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (2d
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Although the Committee determined not to press formal charg-
es, it warned Michelman that he should not engage in dual
representation."
As a result of Michelman's conduct, in 1989, the New York
legislature amended Section 374(6) of the New York Social
Services law to prohibit dual representation in adoption pro-
ceedings." Not only must an unwed birth mother seek her
own attorney, but it is preferable that the adoptive parents not
recommend one to her.39 If the unwed mother does not know
of an attorney to represent her, she should be advised to con-
tact the clerk of the Surrogate's court or local bar association
which can recommend an attorney familiar with adoption."'
If it appears that any lawyer engages in advising both the
unwed mother and the adoptive parents, the consent will be
invalid, and the adoption vacated.41 Moreover, the attorney
violating section 374(6) may be subject to discipline by the
Grievance Committee.'
Although the prohibition against dual representation is a
step in the right direction, its protection does not extend far
enough to guarantee that unwed birth mothers make informed
and voluntary decisions. New York law requires that unwed
mothers be informed of their right to counsel and that, if they
choose to seek legal advice, they can be represented by their
own counsel, but it does not require that birth parents be rep-
resented by counsel in adoption proceedings. Currently, unwed
birth mothers who choose not to have advice of an attorney
may remain uninformed and ill-advised of their rights regard-
ing adoption consents.
Dep't 1994).
2=1 Id.
131 N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1992); see also, Ch. 314 § 2 [1989]
N.Y. Laws 723, 724; Ch. 315 § 1 [1989] N.Y. Laws 724, 725.
=9 Carrieri, supra note 128, at 451.
" ' Carrieri, supra note 128, at 451.
See Adoption of Samuel, 167 A.D.2d 909, 912, 562 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (4th
Dep't 1990); Adoption of Baby Boy, 147 fisc. 2d 873, 878, 556 N.YS.2d 463, 467
(Sur. Ct Rensselaer County 1990).
1,2 See In re Stanley B. Milchelman, 202 A.D.2d 87, 616 N.Y.S.2d 409 (2d Dept
1994). The Grievance Committee suspended the attorney for three years for ropre-
senting both the adoptive and birth parents in adoption proceedings. Id. at 92, 616
N.Y.S.2d at 412. The Committee rejected his argument that the adoption could not
have gone forward because the birth mother did not wish to have independent
counsel. Id.
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The danger that unwed mothers may consent to an adop-
tion without being fully apprised of their rights and, thus, not
make voluntary final decisions is illustrated by In re Ricky
AA." In Ricky AA., the court refused to vacate an adoption
where it was questionable whether an unwed mother not rep-
resented by counsel understood the consequences of her
acts.' The fifteen-year-old unwed mother had appeared in
family court, unrepresented by counsel, and executed her con-
sent to adoption."4 According to the family court, immedi-
ately after her execution of consent, the court became con-
cerned about the unwed mother's voluntariness absent the
advice of counsel.'46 The family court appointed a law guard-
ian for the unwed teenage mother, but only after the consent
had been obtained. 4 Due to the illness and subsequent re-
placement of the first law guardian, the case languished for
more than two years.'48 Finally, the family court held a trial
to determine the validity of the unwed mother's consent. The
court held the consent "invalid because the mother did not
understand the full import of her action."'
The appellate court reversed, however, eager to promote
the finality of the adoption.5 Curiously, the court focused on
the fact that a second law guardian had been appointed to the
unwed mother two days after she had executed the consent
form,' but ignored the fact that at the time she executed the
form, she did not have the benefit of any law guardian. The
dissent noted that at the time of consent the unwed mother
was in the eighth grade, had repeated three grades and gave
only monosyllabic answers to the family court judge's questions
regarding the consent documents. 5 The dissent further ar-
gued that great deference should be paid to the family court's
decision to vacate the consent. According to the dissent, be-
cause the trial judge who determined that the consent should
1- 146 A.D.2d 433, 541 N.Y.S.2d 264 (3d Dep't 1989).
", Id.
14 Id. at 434, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
146 Id., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
147 Id., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
14 Ricky AA., 146 A.D.2d. at 434, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
149 Id.
10 Id., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
-1 Id. at 436, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
2 Id. at 436, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 266. (Yesawich, Jr. J., dissenting).
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be vacated was the same judge who presided when the consent
was originally given, he was in the best position to evaluate
the voluntariness of the consent.'
The mere acknowledgment of the availability of legal coun-
sel is not sufficient to adequately protect the rights of unwed
birth mothers. Had the unwed mother in Ricky AA. been re-
quired to have the benefit of legal representation prior to giv-
ing her consent, she would have been in a position to under-
stand the import of her actions. To avoid circumstances similar
to these, the New York legislature should amend the Domestic
Relations Law to mandate that all unwed mothers executing
consent to adoption are represented by independent legal coun-
sel.
Ill. REFORM DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE AOPTIVE MOTHER
Promoting stability and finality in adoption relationships
is essential. Because it is difficult for courts to ascertain
through hindsight the actual circumstances under which an
unwed mother consented to an adoption, courts will probably
continue to utilize a "statutory compliance" analysis to promote
finality. Since compliance with New York's current statute is
not sufficient to guarantee that an unwed mother's decision is
an informed and voluntary one, the New York legislature
should amend the Domestic Relations Law to include three
crucial safeguards: (1) imposing time restrictions upon
mothers' ability to execute their consent, (2) requiring unwed
mothers who elect to seek counseling to consult with objective
counselors, and (3) requiring mothers to consult independent
counsel prior to executing their consent. These measures would
both increase protection of unwed mothers' rights and ensure
that compliance with the Domestic Relations Law results in
consents that are informed and voluntary and can support
final placements.
A. Time to Consent
New York's adoption scheme makes it too easy for an un-
wed mother to give up her parental rights prospectively, with-
-s Ricky AA., 146 A.D.2d at 437, 541 N.Y.S. 2d at 267.
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out regard to the turmoil or pressures of pregnancy. Whereas
certain states' adoption laws mandate a waiting period after a
child's birth before parents may consent to an adoption,15
New York law imposes no such requirement. As a result, an
unwed birth mother may hastily execute her consent upon
discovering her pregnancy, and subsequently change her mind
as the pregnancy progresses.'55 Although New York provides
that a parent who executes an extrajudicial consent has a
forty-five-day period to revoke her consent and retrieve custody
of the child, 5 ' this revocation interval begins to run upon the
execution of consent, not the child's birth. Thus, the danger
exists that the revocation period may elapse prior to the child's
birth. Unwed mothers who give birth and then change their
minds after their opportunity to do so has elapsed are not
protected by the forty-five-day window, and may suffer an
unfortunate fate.
While requiring mothers to wait a specific number of days
after giving birth before executing adoption consents may en-
sure that their intentions are serious, it would create prob-
lems. Such time restrictions may interfere both with the
mother's decision-making process and her ability to obtain
financial aid for birth expenses." 7 Preventing unwed mothers
from consenting prior to giving birth may discourage adoptive
parents from paying the birth mother's medical expenses. To
balance these competing interests, the New York legislature
should adopt the position, endorsed by the UAA, that although
birth mothers are not required to wait a specified number of
days after birth before executing their consents, they must
wait at least until after the child is born. 58 The UAA posi-
tion does not interfere with an unwed birth mother's decision-
making process since the mother can still negotiate and coordi-
nate all arrangements with the adoptive parents prior to giv-
e" See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See Dennis T. v. Joseph C., 82 A.D.2d 125, 441 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2d Dep't
1981).
"I N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115-b(6)(a) (McKinney 1988) ("A parent may revoke
his consent to adoption only by giving notice, in writing,. . .no later than forty-
five days after the execution of the consent to the court in which the adoption
proceeding has been or is to be commenced").
17 UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 2-403 commentary at 74 (Proposed Draft 1993).
1"8 UNIF. ADOPTION AT § 2-404(a) (Proposed Draft 1994).
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ing birth.
It is possible, however, that an unwed mother may hastily
consent to adoption in the hospital immediately after giving
birth. Requiring mothers to wait until after birth to consent
will also protect an eager mother in these circumstances. Since
a mother who impulsively executes her consent at the hospital
will have executed an extrajudicial consent, the UAA time
restriction causes New York's forty-five-day window to begin
after the child is born. Thus, the statutory revocation period
will still provide mothers who elect not to place their children
for adoption with an opportunity to regain custody. Moreover,
requiring an unwed mother to wait until after giving birth to
execute her consent to adoption allows her the entire pregnan-
cy period to contemplate the crucial decision of whether to
forever relinquish the child she will bear.
B. Counseling
When an unwed birth mother releases her parental rights
to her child, she has made one of the most crucial decisions she
will ever make. An unwed woman faced with motherhood can
be in an extremely vulnerable position. The hormonal changes
her body undergoes during pregnancy and immediately after
birth may also contribute to emotional turmoil and confu-
sion.'59 During pregnancy, women experience significant
changes in estrogen and progesterone hormonal levels which
contribute to mood swings and depression."O Similarly, wom-
en who have had problems dealing with loss or separations in
their lives, have marital or financial problems, or worry about
having a sick or handicapped child often experience mental
stress.'
Physiological changes coupled with other common reasons
for not wanting the child, such as abandonment by the father,
16 A postpartum mental illness may initially surface before, during or after a
woman's pregnancy. Christine Anne Gardner, Postpartum Depression Defense: Are
Mothers Getting Away with Murder?, 24 N.E. L. Rev. 953, 962 (1990). According to
one commentator, "Physical, psychological and environmental factors have all been
noted, either separately or in combination, as possible causative agents in post-
partum depression." Id.
160 Id.
'B' Id. at 964-65.
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rape, economic instability and inability to obtain child care,
may subject the unwed birth mother to intense mental stress
both before and after birth.162 Therefore, the unwed mother
should be provided with counseling when she begins to contem-
plate placing the child for adoption.
New York's statutory scheme provides that courts must
inform parents who elect to execute a judicial consent of their
right to obtain supportive counseling in both private placement
and agency adoptions.'63 Similarly, when biological parents
execute an extrajudicial consent, the consent must state clearly
that the parent was informed by an attorney of his or her right
to counseling.'" The proposed UAA also provides that the
content of the consent by the unwed mother must contain a
statement that the individual executing the consent has re-
ceived or been offered counseling services.'65 Both the current
New York statutory scheme and the UAA correctly refrain
from mandating that the biological parent submit to counsel-
ing. Imposition of mandatory counseling would undermine the
principle that birth parents should be permitted to decide for
themselves whether or not they want to consult a personal
counselor, a psychologist, a psychiatrist or a social worker.'66
While the New York statute should not impose counseling
upon all birth parents, the Domestic Relations Law should be
amended (1) to prohibit birth parents from being counseled by
persons affiliated with the hospitals or adoption agencies to
which the child is surrendered; (2) to provide extended counsel-
ing for the duration of the revocation period; and (3) to in-
crease publicity of counseling services.
First, amending the adoption statute to provide birth par-
ents with the right to objective counseling is crucial in circum-
stances where an unwed mother contemplates surrendering
her child to a private adoption agency and, in exercising her
statutory right, is counseled by the very agency to which she is
surrendering the child. 6' Because counselors associated with
162 Id.
193 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(2)(b) (McKinney 1988).
16, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115-b(4)(a)(v) (McKinney 1988).
166 UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 2-406(d)(3)(iii) (Proposed Draft 1994).
166 See UNIF. ADOPTION AT § 2-404 commentary at 77 (Proposed Draft 1993).
167 See In re Sandra G., 141 A.D.2d 821, 529 N.Y.S.2d 883 (2d Dep't 1988);
State ex rel. Dunn v. Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children, 133 Misc. 2d
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particular adoption agencies will most likely have an interest
in securing the child for adoption, this presents a conflict of
interest and danger similar to that posed when an attorney
represents both the adoptive and birth parents. Since the legis-
lature has prohibited an attorney's dual representation in
adoption,' the legislature should also extend to birth par-
ents, specifically unwed mothers, protection against potential
undue influence by agency counselors. Instead, unwed mothers
should be referred to multi-service, non-profit family and
children's agencies where objective counseling is available and
all options, including adoption, can be explored.1 Further-
more, prohibiting adoption-agency employees from providing
counseling to an unwed birth mother whose consent they seek
to obtain will eliminate any opportunity for the agency coun-
selor to unduly influence the mother.
Second, the current statute should be amended to explicit-
ly advise a birth mother to seek counseling even after she has
executed an extrajudicial consent. Currently, the New York
statute only requires a birth mother to be informed of this
right prior to terminating his or her relationship with the
child. In fact, the opportunity to obtain objective counseling
during the forty-five-day statutory window period may be cru-
cial to a mother's decision to revoke her extrajudicial consent.
For example, in In re Baby Boy N., the unwed mother executed
an extrajudicial consent to the adoption of her child in August
1990." On October 23, 1990, however, the mother made an
untimely attempt to revoke the consent. 7' Since the child's
birth she had undergone the benefit of psychological counseling
and her attorney had provided ongoing advice throughout the
period. 72 Unfortunately for this unwed mother, even though
the counseling was effective, she did not make her decision to
revoke the consent in time. For others, the benefit of counsel-
399, 506 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986), reu'd, 125 A.D2d 106, 512
N.Y.S.2cl 82 (1st Dep't 1987).
1'6 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (MKinney 1992); see also, Ch. 314 § 2 [19S9]
N.Y. Laws 723, 724; Ch. 315 § 1 [1989] N.Y. Laws 724, 725.
Annette Baran, Be Careful with Code, USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1993, at A10.
1 In re Baby Boy N., 150 Misc. 2d 535, 573 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Fao. Ct. N.Y.
County 1991).
171 Id.
172 Id,
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ing throughout the revocation period may save some unwed
mothers from making an irrevocable choice that has the poten-
tial to affect the rest of their lives.
Finally, steps should be taken to increase the availability
and publicity of counseling services. The Domestic Relations
Law and the UAA are extremely vague as to the extent, scope
and procedure of counseling. The legislature should revise the
Domestic Relations Law to require courts to provide unwed
mothers with a specific list of social service counselors from
which the birth parents can select a disinterested counseling
service. These services should inform women of the conse-
quences of their decisions to place their children for adoption,
and to assist them in resolving any emotional and/or psycho-
logical problems which may be motivating the adoption in
order to prevent women from making a decision they will for-
ever regret.
C. Independent Legal Representation
Although unwed birth mothers in New York are required
to obtain their own attorneys if they elect to have independent
legal representation, there is no requirement that those who
execute consent must be represented by counsel. The New
York legislature should adopt a provision to mandate indepen-
dent legal representation for all birth parents executing con-
sent, in order to prevent the dangers they may face if they
choose to forego this right.
The UAA position on legal representation mandates inde-
pendent counsel, but only for minor parents. The UAA propos-
es that when the parent executing a consent to an adoption is
a minor, she or he must have the advice of a lawyer who is not
representing an adoptive parent."3 The lawyer before whom
the minor executes consent must certify in writing that he or
she has orally explained the contents and consequences of the
consent or relinquishment to the minor, and that to the best of
his or her knowledge or belief the parent executing the consent
read, understood and signed the consent voluntarily, and was
3 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-405(c) (Proposed Draft 1994) The UAA requires the
same for a minor relinquishing a child to an adoption agency. Id.
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offered counseling services.' 4 In contrast, adult birth parents
are merely required to aver in their adoption petition that they
were informed of their right to have a lawyer.
The UAA provision should be modified before incorporating
it into the present Domestic Relations Law because the distinc-
tion drawn between minor and adult parents does not further
any legitimate purpose and should therefore be eliminated.
First, adult parents have brought challenges on the grounds
that they did not understand the nature or ramifications of
their actions.' 5 Second, if the UAA is willing to impose costs
for mandatory legal representation upon minor parents, who
usually do not have finances to support legal fees, the financial
burden may also be imposed on adult parents who are more
likely to be employed and thus better situated to bear it.
The argument that requiring all birth parents who at-
tempt to place their child for adoption be represented by coun-
sel will hinder the adoption process by increasing costs is un-
supported. Because the adoptive parents' attorney is respon-
sible for preparing and filing the adoption petition, the adop-
tive parents will bear most of the costs of the adoption process.
Moreover, the UAA only requires birth parents to seek the
advice of a neutral lawyer. The unwed mother does not engage
in a lengthy relationship with an attorney. Hence, the unwed
mother's lawyer's fee, if any, can be limited to consultation
services wherein the lawyer can simply review a consent al-
ready prepared by the adoptive parents' attorney and/or com-
plete a standard form certifying that the unwed mother under-
stood the import of her consent. Requiring all mothers to be
represented by independent legal counsel will ensure that they
are fairly apprised of the legal implications of their consent.
"' UNiF. ADOPTION AcT § 2-405c(1)-(5) (Proposed Draft 1994).
175 See In re Infant D., 41 A.D.2d 961, 962, 344 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430 (2d Dep't
1973) (Benjamin, J., dissenting); In re Baby Girl Dunn, 133 lisc. 2d 399, 400, 506
N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986) (unwed mother 28 years old); Irn re
Daniel C., 115 Mlise. 2d 130, 453 N.Y.S.2d 572 573 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County
1982) (unwed mother senior in college), aff'd 99 A.D.2d 35, 472 N.Y.S2d 666 (2dl
Dep't 1984), affd 63 N.Y.2d 927, 473 N.E.2d 31, 483 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1984); In re
EWC, 89 Mlisc. 2d 64, 65, 389 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1976)
(unwed mother 21 years old); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 32 Mis. 2d 683, 683,
223 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1962) (unwed mother 23 years
old).
19951
964 BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW [Vol. 61:931
CONCLUSION
The New York legislature should amend the Domestic
Relations Law to incorporate select modified provisions of the
Uniform Adoption Act to increase the protection afforded to
unwed mothers at the time they execute consent. Revising
statutory consent requirements regarding the time of consent,
supportive counseling and legal representation will better pro-
tect birth mothers' rights and, thus, result in greater adoption
finality.
Michelle Cucuzza
